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The Asymmetry of ‘Creation’ and ‘Origination’:
Contrasts within Comparative Theology
Daniel P. Sheridan
Saint Joseph’s College of Maine
I. Semantic Specificity and Theological
Confusion
THE following essay is a contribution to
comparative theology, particularly in its
contrastive dimension. For a successful
comparative theology, the two theologies or
religious perspectives being compared and
contrasted must be described accurately and
equally in depth. Where Christian theology in
its Catholic dimension is one pole of the
comparison, it is important to make a
distinction between doctrine and theology
which I will do below. Issues of translation also
immediately arise.
Recently I re-read two articles I wrote in
1994 and in 1997 for the Journal of Vaishnava
Studies, “Śrīdhara and His Commentary on the
Bhāgavata Purāṇa” and “Madhva, the Bhāgavata
Purāṇa, and His Commentary on Its First
Chapter.” 1 In them, I translated the Bhāgavata
Purāṇa’s opening line according to each

commentator. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa’s first line
has a clear reference to the second sutra of
Bādarāyana’s Brahma Sūtras, i.e. janmādyasya
yatah.
Śrīdhara: “‘Him from whom is the creation,
etc. of this [universe],’ inferred by positive
and negative concomitance in things; allknower, self-luminous; who revealed the
Vedas through the heart to the first sage;
about whom the gods are confused; in
whom the threefold evolution is real as is
the transformation of fire, water, earth; by
his own strength, always free from
deception; the True, the Supreme, [on him]
we meditate.” 2
Madhva: “‘Him from whom is the creation,
etc. of this [universe],’ on account of
harmonization and the other [logical
reasoning about the senses of scripture],

Daniel P. Sheridan, Ph.D. (Fordham University, 1976) is Professor of Theology at Saint Joseph’s College
in Maine. He is an engaged scholar at the intersection of Catholic systematic theology and the history of
religions with special interest in Hindu theism, especially the Madhva tradition. He has published two
books, The Advaitic Theism of the Bhagavata Purana [Motilal Banarsdass 1986] and Loving God: Krsna and
Christ [Peeters 2007], and numerous articles in The Thomist, Anima, Journal of Religion, Horizons, Journal of
Vaisnava Studies, Chicago Studies, Journal of Dharma, Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education, Studies in
Formative Spirituality, Purana, Cross Currents, Journal of Religious Studies, Religious Traditions, Hindu-Christian
Studies Bulletin, and Journal of Religious Pluralism. He is currently studying the work of Charles Taylor on
secularity and writing a book on the Catholic theology of the diaconate.
Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies 28 (2015):76-87

The Asymmetry of ‘Creation’ and ‘Origination’: Contrasts within Comparative Theology 77
all-knower, self-ruling; who revealed the
Vedas through the heart to the first sage;
about whom the sages are confused; in
whom the threefold evolution is
[apparently] false as is the transformation
of fire, water, earth; by his own strength
always free from deception; the True, the
Supreme, [on him] we meditate.” 3
The Sanskrit word I translated here as
“creation” is janma. Francis Clooney had
translated janma differently in a related passage
from the much earlier Brahma Sūtras of
Bādarāyana [fifth century BCE ?] which the
Bhāgavata Purāṇa [eighth century CE ?] was
citing:
Next, therefore, the desire to know
Brahman.
‘Brahman’ indicates that whence derive the
origination, etc. of this world.
Brahman is knowable because it is the
source of the teachings.
It is known from the Upanishads because it
is their consistent object.
A quick survey of different translators at
hand revealed the following: janma as
“creation” (Sheridan; Pereira; Raghunathan;
Sanyal, Sharma); janma as “origination” or
“origin”
(Dasgpta;
Clooney
[1993],
Vireswarananda; Panikkar; Apte; Thibaut);
janma as “source” (Radhakrishnan); janma as
“birth” (Gambirananda; Clooney [2001]). Thus
this somewhat random selection shows a
general divide between those preferring a
translation of janma as “creation” with a
significant,
almost
unavoidable,
theological/Christian
denotation
and
connotation and those who translate it with a

significantly less theological term. In view of
the ongoing work of comparative theology in
which translation is always a major issue, is
“creation” an appropriate translation of janma
in connection with Bādarāyana and citations of
this verse in later works like the Bhāgavata
Purāṇa? And what considerations are involved
in answering this question of translation?
I am exploring a very difficult area of
comparative theology, that is, the area of how,
and how well, we form categories and concepts
suitable for inter-religious subjects that we
study and about which we reason. This may be
based on how we translate specific words from
one religious tradition to another. Dilemmas of
category formation and conceptual taxonomy
arise when concepts that have specific
theological definitions in one religious
tradition, while also accompanied by a broad
semantic range within that religious tradition,
are used to translate concepts in another
religious tradition, which may have a different
semantic range. 4
For example, in the interaction between
the Christian religious traditions and Hindu
religious traditions over the past five centuries,
we can discern several different types of uses of
theological terms taken from Christian faith (in
English) and then used within the religious
traditions of Hinduism (in English). In the case
of the theological concept of God, (1) “God,” in
its Christian theological usage as “supreme
being,” is used in a homologous function within
some of the traditions of Hinduism; thus the
conceptualization of God is thought to be close
to the conceptualization of Brahman. Witness
Clooney’s book Hindu God, Christian God. 5 (2)
“God” can be used to translate a term in
Sanskrit with a specific definition within
Hinduism, “Brahman,” even though “Brahman”
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has its own broad and very different semantic
range among the religious traditions of
Hinduism. (3) “God” and/or “Brahman” can
become inter-religious, or comparative
theological, categories that postulate a putative
identical reality that is called “God” in
Christian theology and “Brahman” in Hindu
theology. In Clooney’s perspective, this last sets
up not a mistake in judgment but a dual process
of reading and reasoning through the claims of
the two religious traditions. In my judgment,
however, we must be clear that the existence of
an equivalent reality across the two traditions
should be a conclusion, not a premise, in either
theology.
My concern about translating janma as
“creation” also raises the questions whether
these three types of uses are legitimate, and
then whether they are theologically useful for
either Christian theology or Hindu theology. I
think that the term “theology” can itself be
used in these three ways. However, to judge the
legitimacy of these uses we must, following
Clooney, read the texts from the two traditions
and then reason across the two traditions. Of
course, this is very much the work of a
comparative theology that relies on
appropriate and accurate translations. A
penultimate investigation is appropriate about
the use, misuse, and abuse of Christian
theological terms like “God” and “creation”
when translating Sanskrit terms.
For historical, cultural, and theological
reasons, contemporary studies of the
intellectual traditions of Hinduism are often
published in English. Thus terms and categories
borrowed from Christian theology, sometimes
from Protestant contexts, are often used in
their English forms. In the words of Parimal G.
Patil,

There are significant asymmetries in the
project of ‘comparative theology’ that
reflect and reveal the complex historical,
intellectual, and political realities of
Christianity’s encounter with ‘others’ . . .
It is not possible, in my opinion, to
accurately describe Hindu arguments and
theories in English without a deep
familiarity with philosophical and Christian
writing in English. Thus, any discussion of
Hindu material that is authentic to the
tradition and intelligible to contemporary
theologians will already have to be
comparative and dialogically responsible to
Christian traditions of theology . . . As
theologians from other traditions are
allowed to contribute to the conceptual
resources of the discipline, the vocabulary
and style of English language theology
should . . . become properly interreligious. 6
Patel may be too sanguine about the coherence
of our English theological vocabulary, not yet
“properly interreligious.”
For forty-three years I have been
translating Sanskrit texts. I often found myself
flipping through Sanskrit-English dictionaries
looking for English words that might match
Sanskrit words. It took me a while to realize
that the dictionaries depended on Oxbridge
study of Latin and Greek, the Authorized
Version, the Book of Common Prayer,
Shakespeare, etc. The dictionaries were
unfamiliar with philosophical and theological
vocabularies from the Latin Christian tradition,
and were certainly unfamiliar with the Greek
and Oriental Christian traditions. To know
something definite in comparative theology,
we need a “properly interreligious” English
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theological vocabulary that is appropriate both
to the Christian traditions and to the Hindu
traditions. This is precisely the challenge of an
optimal comparative theology: how to be
dialogically responsible. This responsibility
certainly presumes something that is still
rather rare, that is, an informed, professional,
and competent understanding of, and across,
two differing religious traditions.
II. Reasoning about ‘Creation Out of Nothing’
Only, perhaps at the time of the Council of
Nicaea in 325 CE in regard to definitive
Christian doctrine, and then in the subsequent
theological writings of figures like Saint
Athanasius [c.296-373 CE], Saint Augustine
[354-439 CE], and later Saint Thomas Aquinas
[c.1225-1274 CE], did the defining contours of
Christian monotheism become clear in the
formulated doctrine. 7 As a premise for the
Trinitarian affirmation of the salvific role of the
Son of God, Jesus Christ, Christian monotheism
presented God the Father as eternal begetter of
the Son, and as totaliter aliter [totally other]
creator of the world. From the human point of
view, the doctrine of creation out of nothing
allows God apophatically to be mysterious in
God’s own Triune being, and kataphatically to
be revealed in God’s created world. The
doctrine of creation was based on four
judgments of reasoned faith, confirmed by
reading the scriptures. The first is that God the
Father is the cause of all reality, both the
eternally begotten and eternally proceeding
realities of the second and third divine persons
and the reality of all that is not God. The second
is that God as source, that is, as Father,
eternally “begets” the Son from God’s own
being, and in turn the Spirit “proceeds” from
the same source; thus God is triune. A crucial

distinction was made that “begetting” is not
“creating” and “creating” is not begetting”. The
third is that for everything else, the heavens
and the earth, all things visible and invisible,
the universe, God is not the source in the
senses of Neoplatonist emanationism, but
uniquely the creator. The world was not
“begotten” by God, but “created” by God out of
nothing, that is, not from God’s own being nor
from anything preexisting. The fourth is that
creation took place at the “beginning.”
Comparatively, it is my judgment that the
Christian doctrine of God’s creation of the
world out of nothing and with a beginning may
find homologues in Hinduism, but that the
Christian doctrine of God’s creation of the
world out of nothing with a beginning is
singularly distinctive of Christian faith in its
creedal form. It is not found elsewhere. This is
an a posteriori judgment that may be disproved
by a single instance.
The judgment of creation out of nothing
requires what has been called the “metaphysics
of creation.” Robert Sokolowski describes the
doctrine of creation out of nothing as the basis
for the “Christian distinction.”
The Christian distinction between God and
the world is therefore a distinction that is,
in principle, both most primary and yet
capable of being obliterated, because one of
the terms of the distinction, the world, does
not have to be. To be God, God does not
need to be distinguished from the world,
because there does not need to be anything
other than God alone . . . And the world is
not diminished in its own excellence, it is
not somehow slighted because God is not
related by a real relation to it; rather the
world is now understood as not having had
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to be. It did not have to be, it is there out of
choice. And if the choice was not motivated
by any need of completion in the one who
let it be, and not even motivated by the
need for ‘there’ to be more perfection and
greatness, then the world is there through
an incomparable generosity. The world
exists simply for the glory of God. The glory
of God is seen not only in particularly
splendid parts of the world but in the very
existence of the world and everything in
it. 8
This Christian foundational and definitive
doctrine, that God created the universe out of
nothing with a beginning, that is, not out of
God’s own being nor from anything
preexisting, has remote homologues, but not
analogues, within the religious traditions of
Hinduism. I distinguish here “analogy,” as used
theologically, from “homology,” as used
In
a
coherent
comparatively. 9
Christian/Catholic theology, the “analogy of
being” is used to justify speech about God with
language that is neither univocal nor equivocal.
God has being; created beings have being. The
word “being” in both cases does not assert the
same judgment. God and the created being are
infinitely different. “Being” is therefore
predicated neither univocally nor equivocally.
Created beings are not similar to God, nor do
they add anything to God. Human concepts
derived from created being can be used of God,
but only “analogously.” 10
In contrast, homology when used in
comparative contexts seeks to avoid
equivocation by describing a similar function in
a dissimilar system, an asymmetrical
resemblance of realities otherwise unlike. For
example, Yahweh and Tao may be judged

homologous because they are both at the
center of their different religious traditions.
They are the central terms of reference, yet in
other very important respects dissimilar, more
unlike than like. Perhaps they can in a limping
way be compared to the wings of a bird and the
wings of an insect. Both wings enable flight, but
biologically, structurally, physiologically, and
chemically, they are very dissimilar. According
to the judgments of their different religious
traditions, Yahweh and Tao do not refer to the
same reality at all once Yahweh is related to
the judgment that Yahweh is that which
created the universe out of nothing, not out of
God’s own being nor out of anything
preexisting. The Tao is not that.
The Christian doctrine of creation is not
easily understood in ordinary language. A
special theological language emerged in the
patristic period of the first six Christian
centuries. It is possible to conceive of God
without a created world. It is possible to
conceive of a world without God. The world
might not have been. If the world does exist by
creation, if it is “gifted” by God, then the
response should include gratitude for the
world’s existence, and wonder at the way it is.
Theological reasoning about gratitude to the
Triune God and wonder at the universe leads to
a theology of human freedom and love for
God. 11
However, one thing that creation is not is
that it is not a change. The created universe has
no material cause. Nothing changes. Thomas
Aquinas theologically states this emphatically.
Creation is not change, except merely
according to a mode of understanding. For
change means that the same something
should be different now from what it was
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previously. . . . But in creation, by which
the whole substance of a thing is produced,
the same thing can be taken as different
now and before only according to our way
of understanding, so that a thing is
understood first as not existing at all, and
afterwards as existing. . . . Creation places
something in the thing created according
to relation only; because what is created is
not made by movement or change. . . .
Hence creation in the creature is only a
certain relation to the Creator as to the
principle of its being. 12
Aquinas also argued that “in the beginning”
could not be reasoned to. It requires revelation.
I answer that, by faith alone do we hold,
and by no demonstration can it be proved,
that the world did not always exist. 13
Thus the great Hindu dialecticians had no
reason to reason to “beginning.” The conjoined
creation of the universe by God out of nothing
and of one that begins may be a “haplax
legoumena” [one-time teaching] with no
corresponding Hindu homologue. This
judgment is tentative. 14
III. Additional Complexity
Contemporary
Western
philosophical
tradition was influenced by the Christian
doctrine and theologies of creation out of
nothing. Even as it may no longer accept it, 15
philosophy is haunted by the question of why
there is something rather than nothing. This
question is not synonymous with the judgment
of creation out of nothing. As Martin Heidegger
states, even as he rejects the judgment of
creation out of nothing:

Why are there ‘existents’ [things that are]
rather than nothing? That is the question.
Clearly it is no ordinary question . . . And
yet each of us is grazed at least once,
perhaps more than once, by the hidden
power of this question, even if he is not
aware of what is happening to him. 16
The question remains open, and peculiar,
whatever way an attempt at an answer it made,
because it cannot be answered on its own
terms. For this question there is no
Archimedean point from which to answer.
Heidegger’s question works both ways. As Hans
Urs von Balthasar states:
Why in fact is there something rather than
nothing? The question remains open
regardless of whether one affirms or denies
the existence of an absolute being. If there
is no absolute being, whatever reason could
there be that these finite, ephemeral things
exist in the midst of nothing, things that
could never add up to the absolute as a
whole or evolve into it? But, on the other
hand, if there is an absolute being, and if
this being is sufficient unto itself, it is
almost more mysterious why there should
exist something else. 17
A theology comparative of the judgments
of Christian faith and of judgments of the
religious traditions of Hinduism must attend
both to the doctrine of creation out of nothing
and to the reasoning behind it. Both Christian
and Hindu theology as they develop will also
come to be haunted by the question why there
is anything at all. The last question adds to the
asymmetries that Patil describes above.
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A theology that is comparative must also
take account of the rejection of the creedal
doctrines and theologies of Christian faith by
much of the Western philosophical tradition
since Descartes, a rejection which would
logically extend to the religious traditions of
Hinduism as well. For example, John R. Searle
says:
Given what we know about the details of
the world---about such things as the
position of the elements in the periodic
table, the number of chromosomes in the
cells of different species, and the nature of
the chemical bond---this world view is not
an option. It is not simply up for grabs
along with a lot of competing world views.
Our problem is not that somehow we have
failed to come up with a convincing proof
of the existence of God or that the
hypothesis of an afterlife remains in serious
doubt, it is rather that in our deepest
reflections we cannot take such opinions
seriously. 18
We will not discuss further the need for
comparative theology to consider this dismissal
of Christian and Hindu worldviews, but it
should be kept in mind.
IV. Reasoning with Śaṁkara about “Whence the
Janma, Etc. of This”
Bādarāyana’s Brahma Sūtras is the key text
for the Hindu traditions known as Vedānta.
There is a divergence between the monistic and
theistic traditions of Vedānta ranging through
ontology, epistemology, and soteriology.
However, Advaita Vedānta emphatically
affirmed the perfect being of Brahman, the
Supreme. Brahman is the ultimate goal of the

human quest. Brahman is so transcendent that
it includes all that is finite. This transcendence
is thus immanent in all that is finite. How this
could be explained is the cause for the
divergences among the Vedāntic traditions.
Selfhood is the primary analogue for
understanding Brahman. It is the basis for
whatever relationship there is between
Brahman and finite selves. The monistic or
Advaitin tradition of Śaṁkara [first half of the
eight century CE] asserts that the Supreme Self
or Brahman is the only ultimate reality, and
finite empirical existence is unreal from the
perspective of Brahman. At first, Śaṁkara
seems to accept Bādarāyana’s assertion that
Brahman is “that from which the janma, etc. of
this universe.” However, he goes on to assert
that judging “one thing to be another” is
always an error. After the removal of such a
superimposition, he can deny that there is a
material cause [pradhānā] of the universe. He
cites Bādarāyana to show that there is not an
independent cause of the universe.
[The pradhānā of the Saṁkhyas is] not the
cause of the universe, because it is not
mentioned in the Upaniṣads, [which fact is
clear] from the fact of seeing [thinking]. 19
This assertion of Bādarāyana as understood by
Śaṁkara is based on Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.ii.12:
In the beginning, my dear, this world was
just Being [sat], one only, without a second.
To be sure, some people say: ‘In the
beginning this world was just Non-being
[asat], one only, without a second; from
that Non-being Being was produced.’ But
verily, my dear, whence could this be?’ said
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he. ‘How from Non-being could Being be
produced? On the contrary, my dear, in the
beginning this world was just Being, one
only, without a second. 20
This concurs with the Christian teaching that
God did not create the world out of anything
other than God. This is not, however, creation
out of nothing because there is no difference
between cause and effect [satkāryavāda]. For
Śaṁkara the concepts of cause and effect serve
a propaedeutic purpose, but, as in the end they
are considered errors, they are eventually
superseded by knowledge of the real. There
really is no “created” or “orginated” universe,
since the universe is not metaphysically
different from Brahman.
This lack of difference is not reciprocal.
Brahman as cause is identical with its effect in
the universe, but the effects of the universe are
not identical with the cause. Thus all effects,
whatever one makes of their relative reality,
are ultimately unreal in the face of the
transcendence of a Brahman understood as
non-dual. There cannot be a second except as a
mistake. Brahman so conceived cannot engage
in creative activity or be creative in act of a
“created” or an “originated” world. Activity
involves a change and a lack of permanence
that are incompatible with Brahman’s
transcendence. The apparent effects in a
separate “originated” world are some kind of
mistake. Brahman is indeed totaliter aliter,
totally other, from the originated world, but
the originated world is totaliter non aliter [totally
not other] to Brahman. For Śaṁkara causality,
except perhaps as a pure potentiality which
cannot be actualized, cannot be reconciled with
the transcendence of Brahman. A pure

potentiality which cannot be actualized is not a
potentiality. Thus it is not two, advaita.
Two additional points can be made here.
The first is essential to the Hindu religious
traditions of Vedānta. Janma is always
associated with, and never separated from, the
“etc.” These are “sustenance” and “dissolution”
of the universe. The second point is essential to
Śaṁkara. These three provide only an
indicative definition for Brahman, not an
essential one. They point to the existence of
Brahman. If one says, “see that man in the
yellow robe,” the man is known through the
attribute of the yellow robe. The man is not the
yellow robe, but the yellow robe follows him
around. If one says, “bring the man who saw
the sea,” the man can be brought, but not the
sea. Thus the “janma, sustenance, and
dissolution of the universe” are like the yellow
robed man whom we see because we see the
yellow robe. At the same time, they are also like
the man who saw the sea, because when he is
brought here he does not bring the sea. Neither
are the yellow robe or the sea essential
indicators, but they are indicators. This is the
case with the “janma, sustenance, and
dissolution of the universe.” When we see
them, we know Brahman. But when we know
Brahman, we know that Brahman is not the
“janma, sustenance, and dissolution of the
universe.” Certainly, in the tradition of
Śaṁkara, Brahman does not cause the “janma,
sustenance, and dissolution of the universe.”
This means that the reality of processes of the
universe can be reduced to Brahman, but more
deeply that the reality of the universe cannot
be reduced to, or deduced from, the existence
of Brahman. This has been called a “nonreciprocal relation of dependence.” 21 The
universe is only real in its cause and is unreal as
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an effect. In effect, since it is unreal as an
effect, it really is not caused either. Brahman is
not two.
IV. Does Madhva Make a Difference?
Madhva [1238-1317 CE] was the founder of
the school of Dvaita Vedānta, also known as
Tattvavāda [lit. teaching of reality]. 22 His
teaching is a major point of departure in the
long-running Vedāntic debate between theism
and non-dualism. Madhva protests against the
non-dualism of Śaṁkara. Madhva is sometimes
mentioned as the Hindu thinker closest to the
Western monotheistic religions. However,
Madhva does not teach creation ex nihilo, the
Christian teaching that God created the world
out of nothing with a beginning.
For Madhva, Brahman is God, understood
and identified by name as Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is the
primary, personal and divine reality who is
metaphysically different from the individual
self and from the plurality of the other beings
of the universe. Brahman/Viṣṇu is the sole selfdependent reality. Brahman is not the material
cause of the universe. The universe is not a
modification of Brahman. This is the overall
import of the authoritative Hindu scriptures:
Therefore,
as
non-difference
is
contradicted by all the sources of
knowledge, it is not the purport of the
scriptures. On the contrary, the highest
meaning of all the scriptures is the
preeminence of Viṣṇu over every other
entity. 23
The correct import of the scriptural texts was a
unique form Hindu monotheism that proposed
the eternal metaphysical difference between

God as independent and everything else as
eternally dependent on God.
The universe has five differences: there is
the difference between the individual self
and the Lord. There is the difference
between the Lord and on-sentient material
realities. There is the difference between
the individual selves. There is the
difference between individual selves and
non-sentient material realities. There is the
difference between one non-sentient
material reality and another. The
difference between these five is real. 24
In the words of Ignatius Puthiadam:
The Supreme Being’s transcendence is not
expressed by means of the analogy of
being, but by making Viṣṇu a ‘tattva sui
generis,’ with certain specific attributes. . . .
Transcendence, in the final analysis is not
the total otherness in being, the otherness
in existence itself, but the fact of being the
greatest in a hierarchy of existents. 25
Thus Madhva’s teaching about Brahman/Viṣṇu
is only a remote homologue to the Christian
doctrine God’s creation of the world out of
nothing. Madhva does not make a difference
here.
V. Conclusion: A Class of Homologous
Doctrines: “Creation out of Nothing” and
“Whence the Origination, Etc. of This”
If we accept the Christian understanding of
the terms “creation out of nothing,” then
Bādarāyana, understood according to Śaṁkara,
is not speaking about creation at all nor is
Madhva. The same is true for the Bhāgavata
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Purāṇa. I mistranslated the opening line from
the Bhāgavata Purāṇa both according to
Śrīdhara and according to Madhva. In these
contexts janma is mistranslated as “creation.” It
should be “origination, etc.” However, thinkers
from within the Hindu traditions if they engage
in comparative theology should be intrigued
about the Christian doctrine “creation out of
nothing.” The Christian faith’s judgment of
“out of nothing’ is tantalizingly close to
Śaṁkara’s denial that Brahman is a
metaphysically material cause, but it is quite
far from Śaṁkara’s denial that the effect
ultimately exists. His “non-reciprocal relation
of dependence” of the universe on Brahman
can be tantalizingly close to the doctrine of
God’s creation out of nothing, but theologically
it lacks the giftedness of a real gift of reality to
the universe. Origination is not creation.
In the Christian reasoning about creation,
there is a further element that is added to “out
of nothing,” and that is “with a beginning.” The
Christian doctrine is incomplete without “with
a beginning.” Therefore, I conclude, although
tentatively, that the Christian doctrine of the
creation of the universe by God out of nothing,
but with a beginning, is close to being a “haplax
legoumena” [one-time teaching] with no
corresponding, or even near, homologue within
Hinduism. 26 Nonetheless, like its Advaita and
Dvaita Vedānta relatives of several removes,
the Christian teaching on God’s creation of the
world out of nothing with a beginning is
dependent on revelation from God, not on
reasoning alone. So too are the conclusions of
Advaita about the non-duality of Brahman and
all that appears to exist; and also the
conclusions of Dvaita that Brahman is different
from everything else and that everything else
is real and not just appearance.

At this point in the ever deeper probing of
an asymmetrical comparative theology, it is no
longer correct to translate janma in the context
of Advaita or Dvaita Vedānta as “creation.”
“Origination, etc.” is to be preferred. “Creation”
is a category mistake since “creation out of
nothing” and “whence the origination, etc. of
this [universe]” represent two contrasting
instances of a loosely gathered comparative
class of homologous doctrines. They are a class
of remotely homologous doctrines about the
relation of the transcendent and the finite,
which again are differently defined by each
religious tradition. It may be the case, pace
Clooney, that close reading and reasoning is
building up, rather breaking down, a boundary
between Christianity and Hinduism, albeit
asymmetrically. We are still early in the
development of comparative theology whether
in its generic, or Christian, or Hindu forms. In
its Christian development, it is even more
premature to presume that appropriate
categories have yet been found that can do
justice to the differences among the religious
traditions. In the case investigated here, the
comparison of “creation out of nothing” and
“whence, the origination, etc. of this universe”
requires more work. In the words of Francis
Clooney:
One also has to know what to do with these
similarities and differences once they are
identified, how to decide which ones
matter more, and how to determine which
are the significant questions raised by
them. Making sense of similarities and
differences is not a pretheological sorting
of details but a theological enterprise that
must be undertaken meticulously and with
respect for the complexities of theological
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judgments. What is most interesting and
important eludes a reductive approach that
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